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‘Just another border incident’: The Rann of Kutch and the 1965 
India-Pakistan War 
The India-Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger 
body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier 
skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-
Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the 
Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian 
leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the on-going 
dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.  
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On 10 April 1965, intelligence officials in the British High Commission in New Delhi 
learnt that Indian security forces had killed 25 Pakistani Rangers the day before. The 
Pakistani Rangers is a paramilitary force that guards its side of the India-Pakistan 
International Border (IB).1 The ‘action’, an intelligence signal made clear, took place 
in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh located between the Indian state of 
Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sindh.2 The ‘Rann’ is derived from the Sanskrit 
word irina, or salt waste.3  In a note written in July 1948, Pakistan claimed that the 
northern part of the Rann belonged to it. ‘The boundary in question’, the government 
of the new Pakistani state argued, ‘is still in dispute.’4 India refuted this claim. The 
                                                        
1 Note: The IB divides India and Pakistan. The demarcation was completed in August 1947 
and was formerly known as the Radcliffe Line. The IB is not the same as the Line of Control 
that divides Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir.  
2 [Austin, United States of America, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library; hereafter 
LBJPL], National Security Files [hereafter NSF], Box 129, Vol. 12:64-6:65, Embassy in 
Bombay to Dean Rusk, Bombay, 10 Apr. 1965. 
3 [New Delhi, National Archives; hereafter NA] Ministry of External Affairs papers 
[Hereafter MEA], File Number: P V 152 (12)/1965, ‘Dispute raised by Pakistan regarding the 
Kutch-Sind Boundary’.  
4 [NA] MEA, ‘T’ Branch, File Number 9/12/65-T, ‘Exchange of notes between India and 
Pakistan’, Pakistani High Commissioner in India to the Secretary, MEA, New Delhi, 14 Jul. 
1948.  
location of the boundary in the Rann, Indian officials responded, ‘has never been [in] 
any dispute.’5 
Confident that this was nothing more than a skirmish, Indian military and 
intelligence sources described the exchange of fire in the Rann in early April as ‘just 
another border incident’. 6  Their demeanour, according to British and American 
officials was ‘fairly relaxed’.7 In a matter of days, by 24 April, the Indian Chief of 
Army Staff would refer to these incidents as a ‘crisis’. The ‘active front’, he argued, 
was ‘now 30 miles in length’.8 The rapid scale of escalation made the headlines in 
London, New Delhi, and Karachi.  
The Times, in London, argued that India and Pakistan were engaged in a 
‘limited border war’.9 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the enigmatic young Pakistani Foreign 
Minister told Indian audiences in Calcutta – on his way to Jakarta from Karachi – that 
‘it was for the first time this conflict [between India and Pakistan in Kutch] has 
reached such a magnitude.’ The Dawn, in Pakistan, carried the quote on its front 
page.10 Indian papers were filled with stories of how Pakistani infantry brigades, 
‘backed by tanks and artillery’, occupied five miles of Indian Territory south of what 
India considered to be the border in the Rann.11 That this was no longer ‘just another 
border incident’ became rapidly clear to those concerned across the world.  
                                                        
5 [NA] MEA, ‘T’ Branch, File Number 9/12/65-T, ‘Exchange of notes between India and 
Pakistan’, Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan to the Secretary, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (MFA), Karachi, 10 Aug. 1949.  
6 [LBJPL] NSF, Box 129, Vol. 12:64-6:65, Embassy in Bombay to Dean Rusk, Bombay, 10 
Apr. 1965. Also see: Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States 
and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
304  
7  [LBJPL] NSF, Box 129, Vol. 12:64-6:65, Embassy in Bombay to Dean Rusk, Bombay, 10 
Apr. 1965. 
8 [LBJPL] NSF, Box 129, Vol. 12:64-6:65. Chester Bowles to Dean Rusk, New Delhi, 24 
Apr. 1965.  
9 ‘India puts its border casualties at 65’, The Times, 27 April 1965. 
10 ‘No talks under shadow of bayonets’, Dawn, 17 April 1965. 
11 ‘Massive attack by Pak army repulsed in Kutch’, Times of India, 24 April 1965. 
 Further, that the Pakistani military was better equipped to fight a limited war 
in the Rann became equally clear to civilian leaders and the Indian military. By the 
third week of April 1965, the Indian ambassador in Washington – B. K. Nehru – met 
regularly with Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State. Nehru’s aim in these meetings 
was to convince the Americans to pressure Pakistani President Ayub Khan to cease 
firing in the Rann. As Nehru argued - if pushed, India would have no choice but to 
open a part of the front that it dominated. This, he warned, ‘means escalation and we 
don’t want that’.12 The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, focussed then on the 
crisis in Vietnam, was able to offer little more than sternly worded suggestions that 
both sides agree to a ceasefire. Indian and Pakistani criticisms of American policies in 
Vietnam had made both countries unpopular in the U.S. Congress. For his part, 
Johnson was unwilling to go the extra mile in a part of the world that was relatively 
less important at the time.13  
Concerned that continued escalation might lead to a general war, and aware 
that the Johnson administration was less likely to intervene in the on-going crisis in 
South Asia, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson offered to play the role of 
peacemaker. On 30 June 1965, Wilson’s efforts fructified in a ceasefire agreement 
signed between India and Pakistan. Article I of the agreement stated that ‘there shall 
be an immediate ceasefire with effect from 0300 hours GMT’ on 1 July 1965. This 
was, according to the Acting British High Commissioner to Pakistan, meant to mark 
                                                        
12 [LBJPL] NSF, Box 129, Vol. 12:64-6:65, Rusk to Bowles, 27 Apr. 1965. 
13 For a background, see: Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), 153-158, and Robert J. McMahon, The 
Cold War in the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), 305-336 
‘the end of a dangerous chapter in Indo-Pakistan relations’. Equally, he stressed, it 
was supposed to open ‘an opportunity for a better stage in Indo-Pakistan relations’.14  
Yet, the opportunity for peace quickly vanished. In September 1965, India and 
Pakistan went to war. The breakout of hostilities was prompted by a Pakistani attempt 
to instigate rebellion in Indian-administered Kashmir, or the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir (J&K).15  This time, Wilson chose not to intervene. The United Nations 
(UN), and finally the Soviet Union, occupied the space Britain had temporarily 
monopolised in the summer of 1965 - that of a peace broker. The question of what 
precisely happened between 30 June 1965, when a ceasefire agreement on the Rann 
was signed, and the beginning of September 1965, when war broke out, remains 
under-researched. Equally, the specific causes of the war in September 1965 are only 
partially analysed.  
This article makes two sets of contributions. First, it provides a detailed 
account of both the longer historical dispute over the Rann, as well as the limited 
border war between India and Pakistan in April 1965. Most accounts of the 1965 
India-Pakistan War (that broke out in September of that year) pay little attention to 
the conflict in the Rann.16 This article aims to fill this gap. Apart from British and 
American sources, it uses hitherto untapped archival records from India. Second, and 
relatedly, it makes the argument that Ayub’s decision to initiate a rebellion in J&K in 
August 1965, which led to Indian retaliation in September 1965 and the outbreak of 
war, was prompted by his belief that British and American involvement would limit 
                                                        
14 [Kew, United Kingdom; hereafter TNA] DO 196/369, ‘Pakistan: The Rann of Kutch 
Dispute’, Acting British High Commissioner in Pakistan to the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations’, 3 Aug. 1965. 
15 Note: That Pakistan instigated rebellion in August 1965 is well documented, including in 
Pakistani sources. See: Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: 
Sang-E-Meel Publications, 1993), 312-319 
16 Note: The fullest account of the clashes in the Rann can be found in Farooq Bajwa, From 
Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (London: Hurst and Co., 2013), 65-95.  
escalation. Wilson’s personal commitment to peace during and after the skirmish in 
the Rann shaped Ayub’s advance. These perceptions, as misplaced as they may have 
turned out to be, was, as this article argues, as much of a reason for the outbreak of 
war as those offered by scholars in existing works. To be sure, this article by no 
means dismisses existing analyses with regard to the causes of War in 1965 – 
discussed below - but instead adds to such analyses using a wider range of sources, 
including recently declassified reports and correspondences available in India.  
The article is divided into four parts. The first briefly outlines the existing 
analyses on the causes of war in 1965. The second provides a short historical note on 
the dispute in the Rann. The third re-traces the set of events between January 1965, 
when Indian and Pakistani forces first clashed in the Rann, and August 1965, when 
Pakistani regulars disguised as mujahideen fighters infiltrated J&K. In doing so, it 
underlines the role played by Harold Wilson, and Britain more broadly, throughout 
this period. The fourth, and concluding section, assesses the immediate and long-term 
consequences of Britain and America’s retreat from South Asia during the time of the 
War in September 1965.  
 
Existing Analyses 
Three sets of inter-related reasons are said to have led to the outbreak of war in 
September 1965. First, India’s poor showing in the Rann, authors argue, convinced 
some Pakistani leaders – most importantly, Bhutto – that the Indian political and 
military classes were still demoralised following their defeat at the hands of China in 
1962. India, according to these Pakistani leaders, had not recovered from what was 
nothing short of a humiliating reversal against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
Bhutto and a group of younger generals, argues the scholar Shuja Nawaz, understood 
this to be the right time to ‘resolve the Kashmir dispute through military means’.17 
The fact that India’s forces in the Rann were often found retreating, leaving behind 
their arms and ammunition, was telling, observed Pakistani leaders.18 According to 
one of the finest accounts of the war, by the solicitor-turned-writer Farooq Bajwa, in 
September 1965, ‘the real significance’ of the clashes in the Rann was that, for the 
first time since 1948, Pakistan ‘had real confidence in its military strength’.19 Further, 
as Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan’s confidante and Information Secretary in 1965, makes 
clear, following the confrontation in the Rann, Ayub openly embraced the somewhat 
incipient belief that ‘the Hindu [read: India] has no fight in him’.20 In short, hubris 
and a one-sided view of Pakistan’s military abilities led its leaders to experiment with 
adventurism, eventually leading to the outbreak of war.  
Second, Pakistani leaders’ confidence in wresting the whole of Kashmir from 
India was also shaped by their perceptions of what they believed to be a tipping point 
in J&K. The military confrontation in the Rann coincided with mass unrest in J&K. A 
relic believed to be a strand of hair belonging to the Prophet Muhammad was stolen 
from a shrine in Srinagar in 1963. Although this was mysteriously returned a year 
later, it brought tens of thousands of people onto the streets of J&K. 21  Local 
Kashmiris believed that this was, somehow, a conspiracy on the part of the Indian 
government to delegitimise Kashmiri identity. Further, a series of legislative measures 
were adopted in the Indian parliament to more tightly integrate J&K with the Indian 
                                                        
17 Shuja Nawaz, Crosses Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 200-201. 
18 ‘Four Indian soldiers die, 35 captured’, Dawn, 11 April 1965.  
19 Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent, 75. 
20 Gauhar, Ayub Khan, 270. Also see: Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a 
Dove: An Insiders Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2015), 410-
411. 
21 For a brief background, see: Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland 
and Global Politics (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2014), 118-121. 
Union, much to the chagrin of Kashmiris.22 Viewing these events from across the 
border, Pakistan, argues the Kashmir expert Navnita Behera, ‘concluded that it had 
widespread popular support in the Valley,’ in J&K.23 
It convinced Ayub and others in Pakistan that a degree of assistance on their 
part would lead to rebellion in J&K. 24  The timing was moot; by 1965, Ayub’s 
government managed to ‘subordinate’ Azad Kashmir, or Pakistani-administered 
Kashmir,25 and now looked to integrate the whole of the former princely state with 
Pakistan. In August 1965, Pakistani regulars and propagandists, disguised as 
mujahideen fighters, were meant to achieve exactly this. As Chester Bowles, the then 
U.S. ambassador to India recounts, Pakistani leaders ‘decided that the time had come 
to bring military pressure directly to bear on India and to settle by force the 
differences [over Kashmir] which had defied negotiation’.26  
Third, and lastly, scholars make the case that the decision in 1965 to seize 
J&K using military means was shaped by the view in Pakistan that the Indian military 
was still a match for the Pakistani armed forces. This advantage, according to some 
Pakistani generals, would be short-lived. Aware of the rapid pace of India’s armament 
program following the defeat in 1962, ‘Pakistan,’ as Stephen Cohen put it, ‘initiated 
the 1965 War with India’. 27  ‘A “now or never" mentality,’ as another scholar 
                                                        
22 A short and engaging account can be found in: T. C. A. Raghavan, The people next door: 
The curious history of India’s relations with Pakistan (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2017), 75-
79. 
23 Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington DC: Brooking’s Institution 
Press, 2006), 76-80. 
24 For a brief account of how Pakistan read the crisis in Indian-administered Kashmir, see: Ian 
Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst, 2009), 172-179 
25 For an excellent note, see: Christopher Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (London: 
Hurst, 2012), 89-99. 
26 Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941-1969 (New York: Harper 
& Row. 1971), 501-503. 
27 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (California: Univ. Of California, 1984), 139. 
suggests, ‘gripped the decision-makers in Rawalpindi’. 28  The ‘window of 
opportunity’ was said to be ‘narrowing with India’s growing military strength’. The 
bottom-line, as scholars point out, was that ‘Pakistan was running out of time if it 
wanted to affect a military induced solution to the Kashmir imbroglio’.29  
That the so-called window of opportunity was, in fact, closing is borne out by 
statistical data. Whilst Pakistan’s military expenditure between 1960 and 1965 
increased by approximately $400 million, India increased its spending to more than 
$2 billion. Between 1963 and 1965, the two years that witnessed an increase in arms 
sales in South Asia, India outspent Pakistan – in terms of expenditure on arms imports 
– by nearly $300 million.30 Further, and as one of India’s only defence economists 
argues, humiliation in 1962 gave rise to a ‘new defence consciousness in the country’. 
It led to the commissioning of the first Five-Year Defence Plan (1964-1969),31 with 
an initial demand to almost triple the defence budget.32 None of this eluded Ayub 
Khan.33  
Yet, as this article argues, these reasons alone are not sufficient to explain the 
outbreak of the War. A key variable, as far as Ayub and others in his Cabinet were 
concerned, had to do with the likely potential for external intervention. Escalation 
                                                        
28 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 31. Also see: Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: 
Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2013), 110-111. 
29 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 20-23.  
30 Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, ‘Military Security and the Economy: Defence Expenditure 
in India and Pakistan’ in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds) The Economics of Defence 
Spending: An International Survey (London: Routledge, 1990), 197-8. Note: These figures 
are calculated according to 1980 currency exchange rates.  
31 Deba Mohanty, Arming the Indian Arsenal: Challenges and Policy Options (New Delhi: 
Rupa, 2009), 84-5. 
32 Note: The five-year plan initially demanded 5.9% of India’s GNP, see: Foreign Relations 
of the United States, Volume XXV, ‘Memorandum for Record between Robert McNamara 
and Chester Bowles’, 31 March, 1964, 73.  
33 Stephen Cohen, ‘US Weapons and South Asia: a Policy Analysis’, Pacific Affairs 49/1 
(Spring, 1976), 49-69. 
management, they believed, was highly likely because Britain, and perhaps even the 
United States, would dissuade India from going to war. Pakistan’s experience during 
and immediately after the conflict in the Rann-of- Kutch suggested the same. That this 
was not to be the case was as shocking to Ayub as it was to the leaders of the Soviet 
Union, who ultimately stepped in to negotiate peace in South Asia.  
 
The Dispute in the Rann: A History 
On 11 April 1965, the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN argued that 
‘Pakistan[i] armed personnel made illegal intrusions into the area south of the 
boundary between Kutch and Sind’ in the Rann.34 As far as the Indian government 
was concerned, ‘no authoritative map showed [sic] the Rann, or any part of it, as part 
of Sind’.35  The first set of serious armed contacts between Indian and Pakistani 
security forces had taken place less than forty-eight hours before. Clearly, India 
wanted a quick diplomatic solution. Taking the issue to the UN was meant to pressure 
Pakistani leaders to enter into dialogue and find a diplomatic resolution. A week later, 
on 18 April, the Pakistani representative to the UN argued that his country had merely 
taken ‘defensive measures’ following India’s ‘systematic attempts to hinder Pakistan 
border patrols’ in the northern part of the Rann. He did not fail to add that the 
northern part of the Rann ‘had always been part of Sindh’.36  
The total area under dispute was about 3500 square miles. India claimed the 
whole of the Rann up to the northern shoreline, whilst Pakistan claimed the area until 
the twenty-fourth parallel, a few miles south of India’s claim line. As the 
                                                        
34 [TNA] DO 196/360, Permanent Representative of India to the President of the UN Security 
Council, New York, 11 April 1965. 
35 [NA] MEA, File Number: P V 152 (12), 1965, ‘Dispute raised by Pakistan regarding the 
Kutch-Sind Boundary’. 
36 [TNA] DO 196/360, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the President of the UN 
Security Council, New York, 18 Apr. 1965. 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in London confessed to Michael Stewart, the 
Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the dispute was 
hard to understand. Indeed, understanding each party’s position would require an 
assessment of disputes going back to the middle of the nineteenth century.37 Further, 
this was hardly a strategic piece of ground for either India or Pakistan. The Rann was 
(and continues to be) a barren strip of land at the seaward end of the boundaries 
between what was then West Pakistan and India. For some part of the year, it is a 
desert, and at others, because of the monsoon, it turns into a marshy swamp.38 In the 
time of Alexander (325 BC), it would have been a navigable lake.39 
Pakistan’s claim dates back to 1762, when the ruler of Sind, Ghulam Shah 
Kalhora, invaded the whole of the Rann. It established, Pakistan argued, the juridical 
boundaries of Sind that remained in the post-1947 or the post-independence period. 
However, and as both Pakistani and Indian interlocutors agreed during an exchange of 
notes in 1960, Kalhora’s son, Sarfraz Khan, recalled his fathers troops as early as 
1772. This ended, according to historical records, any permanent presence of Sindi 
rulers in the Rann.40 Following several rounds of talks and exchange of notes between 
Indian and Pakistani officials (in 1948, 1956, 1958, and 1959), Kalhora’s decade-long 
invasion became Pakistan’s primary rationale for its claim on the Rann.  
According to Indian records, the territory was the ‘defined’ but ‘un-
demarcated’ border between the former princely states of Sind (that continued to be 
called Sindh in post-independence Pakistan) and Cutch (in the state of Gujarat in post-
independence India). The boundary, according to Indian diplomats, was defined on a 
                                                        
37 [TNA] DO 196/360, ‘Brief prepared for the Secretary of State’s meeting with the President 
of India, 15 Apr. 1965.  
38 [TNA] DO 196/369, Acting British High Commissioner in India to the CRO, 19 Jul. 1962. 
39 [NA] MEA, File No. 9/12/65-T, ‘Pakistani Note’, 1 January 1960 in ‘Notes exchanged 
between the Government of India and Pakistan regarding the boundary between Kutch 
(Bombay) and Sind (West Pakistan) Volume II’.  
40 Ibid. 
map following two sets of trigonometrical surveys held in 1881-1882 and 1883-
1884. 41  It was yet to be demarcated on the ground with clearly defined pillars 
separating Indian and Pakistani territory. British diplomats in 1965 freely admitted 
that ‘Britain did not get around to demarcating the greater part of the boundary 
between Kutch and Sind before relinquishing the Raj’.42  This was relayed to the 
Pakistani side in 1960 during the last meaningful meeting (in Lahore) between Indian 
and Pakistani representatives.43 
India argued that ‘vague claims based on past history of relations between 
Kutch and Sind rulers were settled in an agreement signed in 1914’.44 Accordingly, 
Survey of India maps between 1937 and 1942 showed that the Rann fell well within 
the West India States Agency that merged three princely states, including Kutch, all 
of which belonged to India in the post-1947 period. Lastly, India pointed out that in 
1943, the Chief Secretary of Sind agreed to a map that depicted the whole of the Rann 
belonging to the state of Kutch.45  
In sum, India’s claim rested on the argument that the borders between Kutch 
and Sind had not been contested for more than three quarters of a century during the 
time of British India, and until the Pakistani protest note of July 1948. Further, a more 
exact position of the border was established in multiple sets of exchanges and maps 
(most notably in 1913-14) till Indian independence.46 On the face of it, and as the 
                                                        
41 [NA] MEA Papers, No. 62 (1) P/48-1893, Note, High Commission of Pakistan in India to 
the Secretary, MEA, 14 Jul. 1948. 
42 [TNA] DO 196/369John Freeman to the CRO, 30 Jul. 1965. 
43 Ibid. 
44 [NA] MEA, File No. 9/12/65-T, ‘Indian Note’, 8 January 1960 in ‘Notes exchanged 
between the Government of India and Pakistan regarding the boundary between Kutch 
(Bombay) and Sind (West Pakistan) Volume II’.  
45 Ibid 
46 For a detailed account, see: ‘The Indo-Pakistani-Western Boundary (The Rann of Kutch) 
between India and Pakistan’, 19 February 1968, Volume XVII, United Nations, available at: 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVII/1-576.pdf. An abridged note can be found at: 
tribunal that heard the arbitration proceedings following the clashes in the Rann in 
1965 made clear, both sides had relevant arguments. However, in the end, the tribunal 
awarded only 350 miles of the disputed territory to Pakistan.47  
Legal positions aside, Pakistan’s claim at the time of the clashes in early 1965 
had to do with jurisdiction. It made the case that the northern part of the Rann had 
been administered by it since August 1947, and by the state of Sindh before then.48 
The point about jurisdiction was key. In January 1965, when Indian patrols came 
across Pakistani police forces in the Rann, the Pakistani government argued that its 
security personnel had patrolled the area for many years. There was a customary 
boundary, Pakistani officials argued, that India had trespassed. In turn, these officials 
stated that the ‘intensive Indian patrolling’ in the area prompted Pakistan to react.49 
The clashes in April that year, according to Ayub’s government, were a defensive 
action against an offensive neighbour.  
 
From Kutch to War 
Context 
On 25 January 1965, an Indian Platoon Commander at Karimshahi, in the Rann- of-
Kutch, recorded tracks made by Pakistani military vehicles 1.5 miles inside India’s 
claim line. This was, according to Indian intelligence inputs, the first serious sign of 
Pakistani encroachments in the region. By 10 February, Indian police patrols found 
the Kanjarkot Fort occupied by Pakistani Rangers. The vehicle tracks, argued these 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘India and Pakistan: Award in Rann of Kutch Arbitration’, International Legal Material Vol. 
7 No. 3 (May 1968) 633-705 
47 Farzana Khan, ‘The Rann of Kutch Award’, Pakistan Horizon Vol. 21, No. 2 (Second 
Quarter, 1968), 123-127. 
48 [NA] MEA, File No. 9/12/65-T, ‘Pakistani Note’, 1 January 1960 in ‘Notes exchanged 
between the Government of India and Pakistan regarding the boundary between Kutch 
(Bombay) and Sind (West Pakistan) Volume II’.  
49 [NA] Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the President of the UN Security Council, 
New York, 18 Apr. 1965 
Rangers, were the de facto borderline between the northern and southern parts of the 
Rann.50 According to Indian maps, Kanjarkot was 1370 meters south of the border 
with Pakistan.51 In a meeting between local commanders, both sides claimed the Fort. 
For its part, Pakistan argued that its forces had patrolled the area since 1947. They 
occupied the whole of the Fort on 3 March 1965.52 
The atmosphere in New Delhi, at the time, was calm. Prime Minister Lal 
Bahadur Shastri was un-phased by the rising tension in the Rann.53  He and his 
government were far more concerned about the uprising in Kashmir. As B. K. Nehru, 
his envoy in Washington, made clear to the U.S. State Department, the ‘fragility of 
[the] situation in Kashmir’ was alarming. This could, he argued, become India’s 
Vietnam. Nehru was referring to the attempts made by the Indian state to integrate 
J&K more firmly into the Indian Union and the violent reactions to the same on the 
streets of Kashmir.54  
By the middle of March 1965, notwithstanding the top Indian leaders’ 
indifference to the reports of Pakistani encroachments in the Rann, British officials in 
New Delhi grew concerned. There had been no major incident in the Rann since the 
winter of 1962. They sought-out Indian maps on the Rann and tried to assess for 
themselves the validity of both sides’ arguments.55 They were also in touch with their 
counterparts in Karachi. British officials in Pakistan had long been concerned about 
                                                        
50 [NA] MEA, PAK-I, File No. P1/108/146/65, ‘Kutch Aggression’ May to July 1965. 
51 S. N. Prasad and U. P. Thapliyal (Ed.), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (New 
Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), 20.  
52 [TNA] DO 196/369,‘Pakistan: The Rann of Kutch Dispute’, Acting British High 
Commissioner in Pakistan to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations’, 3 Aug 
1965. 
53 [LBJPL] NSF Country Files: India, Box 129, Vol. 4, 12:64-6:65, Shastri to Johnson, 11 
Feb. 1965. 
54 NSF Country Files: India, Box 129, Vol. 4, 12:64-6:65, Rusk to Karachi, 18 Dec.1965. 
55 [TNA] DO 196/360, D. A. Scott to CRO, New Delhi, 9 Mar. 1965. 
Pakistani adventurism and senior leaders’ – such as Bhutto – desire to stroke the fires 
of revolution in J&K.56 Their concerns were not unfounded.  
Brigadier Riaz Hussain, the Director of the Inter Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI), was convinced that this was the right time to strike in J&K. He 
found unlikely allies in Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary. The 
one person who remained unconvinced was Ayub. Testing India’s resolve in the Rann 
was one thing, a war for Kashmir was altogether another.57 Further, Ayub was more 
concerned about the upcoming elections in Pakistan in the third week of March 
(which he won), and visits to Beijing (2-9 March) and Moscow (3-10 April). He was 
equally concerned about the reactions to these visits in both London and Washington. 
In Beijing, Ayub signed a boundary protocol with Zhou En Lai to demarcate the 
border between Pakistan’s Northern Areas and Tibet. In Moscow, he learnt that a 
scheduled visit to the U.S. had been cancelled by the Johnson administration. 
Unknown to him at the time, a visit by Shastri had been cancelled, too. Indian and 
Pakistani criticism of U.S. policies in Vietnam was the primary reason for the 
cancellations.58 
On 5 April, whilst still in Moscow, Ayub was told that Indian troops had 
moved to an area known as Ding, in what Pakistan believed to be in its part of the 
Rann.59 India had, by the beginning of March, also set-up the Sardar and Vigokot 
Posts. These were rudimentary forward operating bases. Tactical fire fighting 
commenced in the second week of April and finally, on 9 April, Pakistani forces 
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attacked and overwhelmed the Indian police posts.60 Indian personnel temporarily 
withdrew from their posts. Whilst the Sardar post was re-occupied by the Indian army 
twenty-fours later,61 the Pakistani colonels and generals in Rawalpindi made much 
about the fact that Indian soldiers and officers took ‘to their heels at first contact with 
the Pakistani forces’. The Indian forces’ retreat validated the view held by many in 
Pakistan that India no longer had the stomach for a fight.62 Stories of India’s hasty 
retreat made headlines in major Pakistani papers.63 British officials in Karachi were 
equally taken-aback by India’s poor military performance in the Rann.64 
Pakistan’s new found confidence prompted General Musa Khan, the Pakistani 
Chief of Army Staff, to order an entire Infantry Division to move closer to the Kutch 
border.65 By 17 April, orders were given to clear all Indian posts within Pakistan’s 
claim lines. According to Indian military officials, on 24 April, four major Indian 
posts (Sardar, Vigokot, Biar Bet, and Chhad Bet) had come under attack. 66  A 
Pakistani brigade (of 3500 soldiers), supported by tanks, occupied a fifty-mile stretch 
inside India’s claim line.67 Musa Khan, according to Indian sources, placed his forces 
on alert for general mobilisation. Two Brigades were moved to Sind to support the 
activities of the Pakistani 8 Division already in the Rann.68 
The Pakistani attacks from 17 April unnerved both military and civilian 
leaders in New Delhi. Indian Chief of Army Staff, J. N. Chaudhuri, told Chester 
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Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India, that he was ‘faced with a crisis’. The reality of 
Pakistani Chaffee tanks descending on the feebly defended Indian positions in the 
northern part of the Rann had got the better of India’s senior-most army officer. India 
had no armour in the area. Chaudhuri asked for U.S. political intervention, especially, 
as he forcibly argued, since Pakistan was using American military equipment that was 
to be reserved for self-defence, or to fight the Soviet Union.69 Further, Chaudhuri 
made it clear that India had found itself in an unenviable position in the Rann. 
American involvement, he argued, was crucial for ‘restraining escalation’.70 
 Similarly, L. K. Jha, the Indian Foreign Secretary, placed the onus of 
‘restraint’ on the U.S. During a meeting with Bowles on 24 April, he underlined that 
U.S.-made tanks were being used by Pakistan to continue their attacks on Indian 
posts. Jha went on to state that continued attacks could force India to ‘retaliate 
elsewhere’, where ‘conditions [were] more favourable to Indian forces’. This was, as 
far as Bowles was concerned, the first serious sign that the skirmish in a salt marsh 
could quickly develop into a general war.71 Yet, U.S. officials in Washington were 
unwilling to intervene directly. Bowles was told to stand down by his State 
Department. 72  British officials in Washington argued that the cancellation of the 
Shastri and Ayub visits, coupled with Johnson’s lukewarm attitude towards South 
Asia, ‘put the Americans out of court with both sides’.73 As Ayub had predicted, at 
least one of two of Pakistan’s long-time friends in the West would ultimately take 
charge and help broker a peace agreement. The U.S. had played this role during and 
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after the Sino-Indian War in 1962. This time, Britain stepped in to engineer what was 
supposed to be a lasting ceasefire.  
 
A Ceasefire and the Promise of External Intervention 
On 26 April 1965, the Commonwealth Relations Office instructed John Freeman, the 
British High Commissioner in India, and Morrice James, the British High 
Commissioner in Pakistan, to seek interviews with Shastri in New Delhi, and Ayub in 
Karachi. Harold Wilson had taken the firm decision to stabilise South Asia. The 
envoys were directed to ask the respective state leaders if a ‘personal message from 
[the] prime minister would help to bring influence to bear’.74 This was, as one of 
Wilson’s biographers recollects, the prime minister’s most important contribution to 
foreign affairs in his first administration (1964-1966).75 The two leaders in South Asia 
readily accepted Britain’s offer of its good offices to end the conflict.  
To be sure, whilst Britain took the lead, American officials in Pakistan made 
sure to stay in close contact with Pakistani officials. After all, one of the key issues of 
the on-going conflict had to do with American-supplied equipment being used by 
Pakistan against India. With this in mind, Walter McNoughty, the U.S. ambassador to 
Pakistan, kept in regular contact with Aziz Ahmed. Ahmed ‘did not specifically 
concede that American equipment was being used,’ according to McNoughty, but 
‘said he presumed this was probably so’. He alerted the American ambassador to the 
fact that the Indian Air Force had undertaken reconnaissance flights over both, the 
disputed territory and further west in Sind.76 
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Whilst McNoughty made clear to Ahmed that a continued use of American 
equipment against India ‘might create problems over future supplies to Pakistan’, 
there is little evidence to suggest that, at the time, the U.S. was willing to threaten 
Pakistan with possible retributions for doing so.77 Pakistan was an ally, and it was 
crucial to communicate the same to Ayub. That American equipment (most notably 
M48 tanks) was being used in Kutch was without doubt. Jha in New Delhi freely 
shared photos, taken by the reconnaissance flights Ahmed alluded to, with American 
officials.78 Yet, for McNoughty, keeping Ayub on his side was equally important. No 
matter that the Johnson White House had little interest in the conflict, the U.S. 
ambassador did everything he could to make it clear to Ayub that America would 
remain invested in both, his government and South Asia more broadly. At one point, 
following Jha’s warning that India may retaliate elsewhere, McNoughty even mooted 
the idea that if this were to happen, the ‘U.S. would have no choice but to consider 
such [an] attack as unwarranted aggression for assistance to Pakistan under our 
commitments’.79  
By the end of April, and whilst British envoys in New Delhi and Karachi sought 
out an agreeable ceasefire proposal, Ayub seemed to have become more and more 
convinced that South Asia was too important for its fortunes to be left to the two 
warring parties. Wilson wrote to Ayub about the different ways in which de-
escalation could take place. Impartial observers could be deployed according to the 
British prime minister. 80  Wilson’s Foreign Office suggested creating a 
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‘Commonwealth Observer Group’.81  There was little more evidence Ayub would 
need that his western allies would indeed intervene in a military crisis with India82. 
Unlike Shastri, who remained more cautious about Britain’s role, Ayub had no 
hesitation in telling Wilson about the ‘fullest trust’ he had in Britain’s ‘sincerity and 
good faith’.83  
Further, Ayub wanted, and managed, to internationalise the dispute in the Kutch. 
On the other hand, Shastri’s India was caught on the back foot. As a post-mortem 
report on the crisis, authored by the British Foreign Office, noted, by the end of April 
‘the Indian army was unable to contain Pakistan’s attack in Kutch’. Shastri had little 
choice but to agree to international intervention. The idea of retaliating elsewhere 
along the border with Pakistan could spark a war, and, as the report made clear, ‘Mr. 
Shastri and his Chief of Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, were under no illusions that 
this posed terrifying consequences for the sub-continent’.84 On 30 April, an ‘informal 
ceasefire’ was announced for a period of seven days.85 It was clear to both, journalists 
reporting on the war, as well as, British officials, that India’s poor military position 
had forced Shastri’s hand. Less than a week earlier, Indian officials brazenly claimed 
that accepting even a temporary ceasefire was difficult, as it would confirm that a 
dispute did, in fact, exist with regard to the borders in the Rann.86 India’s position 
had, all along, been that the border merely needed to be demarcated, not re-defined.87 
By the end of April, Shastri switched positions and told the Indian parliament that:88  
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If Pakistan gives up its warlike activities I see no reason why the simple fact of 
determining what was the actual boundary between the erstwhile province of Sindh 
and [the] state of Kutch, and what is the boundary between India and Pakistan cannot 
be settled across the table. 
 
Reaching a formal ceasefire agreement was made difficult for two reasons. First, 
India and Pakistan had divergent views on what the status quo actually meant, that is, 
the exact position their security forces would withdraw to following a ceasefire 
coming into effect. For India, it was the respective positions held by both their border 
security forces prior to 1 January 1960. For Pakistan, it meant the complete 
withdrawal of all forces from the entire disputed area in the Rann. As Jha told British 
interlocutors, this was ‘totally unacceptable’.89 Further, India insisted that Pakistan 
vacate the Kanjarkot Fort as a pre-condition for a ceasefire.90  
Shastri had gone public with these pre-conditions.91 Indian opposition leaders 
– like Morarji Desai and Ram Manohar Lohia – challenged the government to ‘make 
a clear stand about Kanjarkot’.92 In Pakistan, news reports underlined both, the fact 
that the government did not desire or need to accept pre-conditions, and that 
Kanjarkot was ‘clearly’ in Pakistan.93 No doubt, domestic pressures and public optics 
mattered, making a ceasefire agreement all the more difficult to complete. As 
Freeman argued, in a dispatch to the British Foreign Office, ‘I think Mr. Shastri 
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would find it politically difficult to agree to a ceasefire publicly without a 
simultaneous agreement to resume the status-quo’.94  
Second, Ayub wanted the negotiations on the Rann to include discussions for 
a resolution to the dispute in Kashmir. Further, being aware that India may ‘retaliate 
elsewhere’, Aziz Ahmed and Bhutto proposed a general withdrawal of forces from all 
border areas, including J&K.95 This was, needless to add, unacceptable to India. India 
went as far as rejecting the use of terms in a final agreement that could be loosely 
interpreted to open the door to negotiate the dispute on and around Kashmir. 
Expressions such as ‘territorial dispute’, ‘arbitration’, and ‘arbitral tribunal’ were 
rejected outright.96 
Finally, during a Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers, in the third 
week of June, the disagreements mentioned above were ironed-out by a determined 
British prime minister. Ayub agreed to Indian patrolling in Kanjarkot, although ‘with 
great reluctance’.97 He also agreed to the status quo date of 1 January 1965. In turn, 
Shastri accepted a set of ministerial meetings to resolve the differences in what he 
insisted on calling the ‘frontier’ in the Rann. The term ‘disputed border’ was avoided. 
India also conceded recourse to an international tribunal ‘in the event of the likely 
failure to reach [an] agreement at the ministerial level’.98  A draft agreement was 
accepted on 26 June,99 and a final agreement was signed simultaneously in New Delhi 
and Karachi on 30 June. At 0530 hours (in West Pakistan) on 1 July, a formal 
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ceasefire was in effect. On 2 July, Ayub publicly stated that he had ordered the 
withdrawal of Pakistani troops.100  
In India, opposition leaders lamented against the government for the ‘virtual 
surrender of our [India’s] national interest’.101 What did not help was Ayub’s public 
position towards the end of the negotiations. Aware that he and his armed forces had 
brought India to the negotiating table, the Pakistani President told audiences in Britain 
how he had spared an entire Indian Division in the Rann. The Indians, he argued, 
were found ‘squealing like they did after their conflict with China’.102 Statements 
such as these only added to the widely-held view amongst Pakistani generals and 
parts of the public that ‘a sense of dismay, despondency, and demoralisation ha[d] 
overtaken the people all over India’.103 Central to this belief of Pakistani superiority 
was the view that the West, and most certainly Wilson’s Britain, would both manage 
and de-escalate crises in South Asia. As Gauhar writes, ‘Ayub was reasonably 
confident that the Rann of Kutch accord might serve as a model for the settlement of 
the Kashmir dispute’. Others in his inner coterie – like Aziz Ahmed – believed that if 
not Britain, then the possibility of Chinese intervention would deter Indian escalation 
in the future.104 In the end, the likelihood of external intervention seemed to have 
been cemented in the minds of Pakistani leaders, both military and civilian. These 
perceptions shaped Pakistani adventurist policies in the weeks following the 
conclusion of the Kutch ceasefire agreement, leading, ultimately, to a war that, in fact, 
invited little interest on the part of either the U.K. or the U.S.   
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From Ceasefire to War 
On 28 April 1965, as the seven-day informal ceasefire was being negotiated by 
British envoys in India and Pakistan, officers of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) were tracking the ‘heavy movement’ of Indian army troops on the India-East 
Pakistan border. The possibility of a larger war remained high in the mind of these 
operatives. What worried them most was how India might react to both the conflict in 
the Rann and the rising tide of violence along the ceasefire line (CFL) that separated 
J&K from Azad Kashmir.105 Other intelligence inputs suggested the probability of 
some form of Pakistani military action in J&K. ‘The most dangerous element is 
advocacy in GOP [Government of Pakistan]’, Dean Rusk concluded, ‘of adoption [of] 
Algerian tactics, i.e., infiltration of irregulars across CFL to stir up violence of 
terrorism in Vale’.106  
In New Delhi, Bowles was clearly concerned. In a meeting with the Indian 
president – Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan – the U.S. ambassador pressed the question of 
Kashmir. Bowles was impressed by Radhakrishnan’s answer that ‘in the right 
atmosphere’ this, too, would be settled. These ‘hopeful comments’, Bowles realised 
were unfortunately detached from the ‘realities of the current situation’.107 Yet, he 
told both Rusk and his counterpart – Walter McConaughy – in Karachi that once the 
Kutch affair had been settled, India would be ‘willing to embark on widespread 
negotiations with Paks’.108 These conciliatory messages clearly had an effect on the 
U.S. ambassador in Pakistan. Ayub and McConaughy agreed about the ‘dangerous 
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flammability’ of the situation in Kashmir. They spoke of the ‘senile and feeble’ 
Commanding General of the UN Military Observer Group, and the need to move 
beyond the UN to solve the Kashmir dispute.109  
That these messages were to convince Ayub of taking limited and covert military 
action in J&K remained unclear to both British and American officials. By the 
beginning of July, plans to infiltrate disguised Pakistani soldiers into J&K were being 
discussed at the highest levels of the government in Karachi. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed 
took the lead.110 As Ayub’s own son writes, the success in the Rann ‘encouraged the 
Pakistan government to revive international interest in the Kashmir dispute’.111 Apart 
from McConaughy, who made clear to Ayub that the U.S. remained invested in the 
Kashmir dispute, British officials in Karachi wrote of how ‘all India-Pakistan disputes 
can be settled through peaceful means’. The Rann accord, they argued, ‘proved 
this’.112 In fact, following the conclusion of the agreement in the Rann, Wilson told 
the House of Commons: 
 
I hope that this may prove to be the first step towards a general improvement in 
relations between India and Pakistan, in whose welfare and peaceful progress all of 
us in Britain have so close and abiding an interest. 
 
British and, to a limited degree, American intervention and counsel during and 
immediately after the signing of the Kutch ceasefire agreement, as Farooq Bajwa 
writes, ‘helped convince’ Ayub that ‘India would succumb to military pressure from 
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the West’.113 For their part, Indian diplomats around the world tried hard to convince 
their foreign counterparts that there was, in fact, ‘little in common between Kashmir 
and Kutch’. Equally, they blamed the BBC for airing shows that suggested expanding 
the scope of the Kutch tribunal to include Kashmir. This was, they wrote, a move by 
‘Pakistani propagandists’ that would seduce Pakistan to armed conflict with little 
hope of peace. The thinking, amongst the so-called propagandists, was 
straightforward. If international audiences and especially the Wilson government 
were so concerned about the dispute in a relatively minor salt marsh, then they would 
most certainly be invested and be willing to intervene in a conflict over the future of 
Kashmir.114 In fact, in his farewell note to the British Foreign Office, Paul Gore-
Booth, the British High Commissioner in India, despairingly recounted:115 
 
The Pakistanis began to feel that, internationally, things were moving in their 
favour and that Pakistan had only got to go on taking a tough line with India for 
them to get their way.  
 
Gore-Booth maintained that Kutch had produced a new ‘procedure for settling 
border disputes’, which, he argued, ‘cannot be stultified by Indian procrastination’. 
The outgoing High Commissioner was certain that the Kutch experience made Ayub 
believe that his allies, such as the U.K. and the U.S., would not abandon him or South 
Asia. In his meetings with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, he supported Ayub and the 
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British Foreign Office’s position that any conflict over Kashmir could be managed 
using the Kutch model of third-party arbitration.116  
On 24 July, Ayub’s Cabinet confirmed a plan to use regular soldiers disguised as 
mujahideen fighters to infiltrate J&K, and spark a rebellion against India forces. It 
was code-named Operation Gibraltar. 3000 such soldiers had begun their training two 
months earlier, in May 1965.117  
On 8 August 1965, Dean Rusk in Washington DC received formal reports from 
the Indian government that ‘large-scale Pakistani infiltrations [were] under way in 
Kashmir’.118 Local units of the Indian army had been tipped-off about the infiltrators 
a few days before by local farmers and shepherds in J&K. The first armed contact 
began as early as 5 August. From the outset, Operation Gibraltar had been 
thwarted.119 Apart from the fact that the infiltrators were found to be uncoordinated 
and under-trained, their was no appetite in J&K for a rebellion. Pakistan had sent six 
‘raiding forces’, each consisting of anything between two to five companies. Their 
main aim, as a British report for the Joint Intelligence Committee put it, ‘included 
sabotages of bridges, disruption of lines of communication, and encouragement of the 
local population to a general uprising’.120 Much to their surprise, local Kashmiris 
worked with the Indian armed forces in tracking down the majority of ‘raiders’ who 
had made it across the CFL. 121  Documents captured by Indian forces proved 
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conclusively that senior Pakistani Generals directed the infiltration. One such letter 
had been hand-signed by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the General-Officer-
Commanding of Pakistan’s 12 Division. It outlined the routes for infiltration across 
the border.122   
The failure of Gibraltar prompted Ayub to authorise what came to be called 
Operation Grandslam. On 1 September 1965, regular Pakistani units opened fire 
across the border in Kashmir. The objective was to capture Akhnur, thirty kilometres 
from Jammu in Indian-administered Kashmir. Doing so would cut off Indian forces 
from the rest of J&K.123  Under pressure, and with the view to give India’s 10th 
Mountain Division time to organise its forces against the Pakistani thrust around 
Akhnur, at 0530 hours on 6 September, the Indian Army crossed the International 
Border and attacked Pakistani Punjab. The conflict that Ayub had wanted to limit had 
escalated into a general war. Finally, on 23 September, a ceasefire came into effect at 
0330 hours, Indian time.124 Contrary to Ayub’s estimation, neither the U.K. nor the 
U.S. stepped-in to manage the crisis, let alone support the so-called ‘Kutch model’.  
In fact, soon after Rusk heard of the Pakistani infiltration in the second week of 
August, the U.S. State Department told the embassy in Karachi that ‘we have 
concluded we should concentrate for [the] moment on asking [the] U.K. to help us to 
get through to Ayub’. 125  The British position was even more curious. By early 
August, officials in London argued that Britain should no longer support the 
arbitration over the Kutch dispute, which continued despite Gibraltar and Grandslam. 
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‘The role of middleman’, one senior British officer stated, ‘is almost bound to become 
uncomfortable and unprofitable sooner or later’.126 Following the second wave of 
infiltrations in late August, Bowles tried hard to persuade the State Department that 
‘failure to call their [Pakistan’s] hand only encourages them to continue present 
actions’.127 It had little effect on either Rusk or the White House.  
Rather than intervene, Johnson’s fatigue with India and Pakistan began to show. 
Robert Komer, better known for his expertise on Vietnam, and who then served on 
Johnson’s National Security Council (NSC), advocated cutting-off military aid to both 
South Asian countries. Johnson approved the decision on 21 September. On that same 
day, the White House made its position clear: ‘The United States should support and 
encourage the United Nations’ efforts’. It underlined, in a note to the Chairman of the 
U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, that the White House would not choose 
sides in this war. It was the UN’s job to broker a ceasefire and bring peace to South 
Asia.128 As for Wilson, he followed Johnson’s lead. His efforts now focussed on 
shaping America’s war in Vietnam. South Asia, as one of his biographers makes 
clear, no longer mattered.129 
 
Conclusion 
For Jagat Mehta, the Indian Charge de Affaires in China, the date of 5 September 
1965 was momentous. It was, as he would later write, a turning point in Sino-
Pakistani relations. According to Mehta, on that day, China, and premier Zhou En Lai 
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in particular, ‘abandoned’ the façade of neutrality in its relations with both India and 
Pakistan. China, finally, and at least rhetorically, made clear that it favoured Pakistan 
in any conflict with India. The decade-long efforts to strengthen the Sino-Pakistani 
partnership crystallised in 1965. On 5 September, Chinese government spokespersons 
openly stated that ‘there is no question of Pak infiltration and the armed conflict was 
entirely provoked by India’. Further, Chinese leaders argued that the violence in J&K 
was a natural result of a ‘National Liberation Struggle’ that had been ignored by the 
U.K. and the U.S. On 11 September, Chinese spokespersons underlined that the 
Kashmiris have the ‘right to self determination’.130  
These were, without doubt, statements designed to limit India’s escalatory 
aims on the battlefield. On 5 September, Indian army movements in Punjab were 
reported. On 6 September, the Indian army attacked Pakistani positions across the IB, 
towards Lahore. On 12, and then 16, September, China issued an ‘ultimatum’ 
demanding that India dismantle its military infrastructure in the east, along the Sikkim 
border with Tibet. This was, as British military intelligence officers concluded, a 
diversionary tactic designed to ‘warn’ Indians that the border in the east was as much 
a liability as that with Pakistan in the west. Three days later, a battalion of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) made incursions in Ladakh, south of India’s claim 
line with China.131 China, Mehta argued, was taking full advantage of the vacuum 
created by Britain and the U.S.’ virtual exit from South Asia in this testing time.132  
This is not to say that Zhou or the PLA were willing to actually fight on 
Pakistan’s behalf. Ayub and Bhutto flew to Beijing on the night of 19 September. 
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Their aim was to convince both Zhou and Marshal Chen Yi – the Chinese Foreign 
Minister – to do more to limit Indian mobilisation along the IB with Pakistan. The 
only guarantee they received, as Zhou made clear, was that China ‘will be 
maintaining pressure all the time’. As far as fighting was concerned, he suggested that 
Pakistan ‘must keep fighting even if you have to withdraw to the hills’. 133  The 
Pakistani leaders were shocked. ‘The whole Foreign Office strategy’, recalls the then 
Pakistani Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar, ‘was designed as a quick-fix to force 
the Indians to the negotiating table’. Much to Ayub’s surprise, the U.S. and the U.K. 
failed to come to Pakistan’s aid, and China advocated a ‘people’s war’ that, in 
practice, Pakistan could not afford. 134  Back-room negotiations between India and 
Pakistan in New York commenced in seriousness on the night of 20 September. A day 
later, China withdrew the ultimatum it had issued to India. Finally, on 23 September, 
a ceasefire came into effect at 0330 hours, Indian time.135  
The war had broken Ayub. He had relied on external intervention to limit 
escalation. This was, as his son later wrote, the primary way in which he thought a 
general war could be avoided. 136  The public were furious, too. America’s non-
interventionist position led to riots on the streets. Just as the ceasefire agreement was 
being signed in New York, mobs on the streets of Karachi smashed, and then set 
ablaze, the United States Information Service Library. They then proceeded to the 
U.S. Embassy, where they were beaten back.137 
In turn, the Soviet Union played the role of the chief mediator. This was in 
stark contrast to the early 1960s, when the U.S. and the U.K. sought to actively broker 
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a deal on Kashmir between India and Pakistan. On 10 January 1966, an agreement 
was signed between Ayub and Shastri in Tashkent. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin 
served as the go-between, shuttling between Ayub’s makeshift office and the one 
occupied by Shastri. Tragically, it was also in Tashkent that Shastri, as the formal 
report of the Indian government stated, ‘breathed his last’ at 1.32 a.m., on 11 January 
1966.138 As for Ayub, he returned to Pakistan, still as President, but politically weaker 
than a year earlier. His faith in American and British interventions in South Asia was 
crushed. During a short visit to London earlier in December 1965, he met with 
Wilson. Ayub made one last attempt at inviting Britain to mediate a larger agreement 
on Kashmir. Tellingly, Wilson made it clear that ‘the situation had become much too 
complicated’. 139  Wilson’s tenor and manner was in stark contrast to that in the 
summer of 1965. At that time, the prime minister had boasted that ‘Britain’s frontiers’ 
extended till the High Himalayas.140  
In the aftermath of the 1965 War, the British prime minister could not even get 
himself to hear-out Ayub, adroitly moving the conversation from Kashmir to more 
abstract issues in world politics. In the end, Britain and America’s changing positions, 
from when the Kutch ceasefire agreement was signed on 30 June 1965 to when Ayub 
was himself encouraged to authorise Operation Gibraltar and then Grandslam, might 
not have been the single driving factor that led to a general war. It was however, as 
this paper has shown, undoubtedly, a central variable that has attracted little attention 
in the larger body of work on the 1965 conflict.   
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